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James Kraska
EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 2005 
CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF  
UNLAWFUL ACTS AGAINST THE SAFETY  
OF MARITIME NAVIGATION
n 2005, the 167 member states of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
adopted the 2005 Protocol to the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlaw-
ful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA)� The resulting 2005 SUA 
Convention is a comprehensive treaty on maritime security that streamlines and 
integrates efforts to prevent and disrupt maritime terrorism� In the decade since 
its adoption, however, many states have not acceded to the new treaty, and most 
of those that have done so have not taken the steps the treaty requires to imple-
ment it effectively, even though the need to do so is perhaps even greater today� 
This article provides a road map for implementation of the 2005 SUA Convention 
to realize the vision for an effective global regime to combat maritime terrorism�
After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the fear was palpable that there would be 
follow-on catastrophic attacks in the maritime domain� Suddenly states worried 
about the global marine transportation system, especially its vulnerability to ter-
rorism� Ships could be used to smuggle weapons of mass destruction or persons, 
conduct attacks on port infrastructure or bridges to paralyze commerce, or attack 
oil and liquefied natural gas tankers to attempt to produce large secondary explo-
sions� The most recent manifestation of this heightened risk is from the Islamic 
State, which has examined the feasibility of mass-casualty attacks against cruise 
ships�1
In response, the member states and secretariat of the IMO developed a slate 
of initiatives to counter these threats, including amendments to the International 
I
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Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) that emerged as the 2002 Inter-
national Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code�2 The ISPS Code attempted 
to develop a culture of threat-based security throughout the maritime cargo sup-
ply chain on which the global economy depends�3
The ISPS Code is a government-industry partnership designed to make the 
commercial shipping industry a less attractive, or at least a more difficult, target 
for maritime crime� The code entered into force in 2004� Simultaneously, states 
took action to facilitate prevention or disruption of terrorist attacks against 
ships and fixed platforms on the continental shelf� In November 2001, the IMO 
Assembly adopted Resolution A�924(22) as a response to UN Security Council 
Resolution 1373 (2001), which decided that states shall take the necessary steps 
to prevent the commission of terrorist acts�4
Resolution A�924(22) called for a review of maritime security architecture 
and prevention of maritime terrorism�5 The resolution requested that the IMO 
Legal Committee undertake a study to determine appropriate updates to the 
IMO Circular on Passenger Ferry Security as well as the SUA and its Protocol for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located 
on the Continental Shelf�6 Thereafter, the Security Council adopted Resolution 
1540 (2004), which recognized the urgent need to take more effective measures to 
prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their 
means of delivery�7
The IMO study mandated by A�924(22) unfolded over six sessions plus several 
intersessional meetings from 2002 to 2005, and culminated in two draft protocols 
that were adopted at a diplomatic conference at IMO in October 2005� The 2005 
Protocol built a comprehensive regime for counterterrorism at sea and maritime 
security, and the new instrument that includes the 1988 Convention as amended 
by the 2005 Protocol is referred to as the 2005 SUA Convention�
The 2005 SUA Convention entered into force in 2010� Now that more than ten 
years have passed since its adoption and more than five years since its entry into 
force, it may be beneficial to assess how far we have come and, more importantly, 
to consider how emerging threats stack up against the existing regimes� In par-
ticular, implementation of the 2005 SUA Convention has been lackadaisical, and 
it is unclear how well the treaty will contend with current trends and emerging 
threats, which include unmanned systems, lasers, and maritime cyber attacks� 
The remainder of this article assesses these issues and provides a way forward 
for states�
This article first looks at how threats from unmanned aerial, surface, and 
subsurface systems fall within the scope of the 2005 SUA Convention� The 
convention was crafted with the realization that the shipping industry would be 
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confronted with a proliferation of unmanned systems and a profusion of com-
mercial, off-the-shelf technologies that could be used to endanger vessels and 
life at sea�
Second, the convention covers dual-use materials: those that may have civilian 
or commercial applications, but also may be misdirected for unlawful purposes�
Third, the convention covers asymmetric criminal activities, such as seizure of 
a ship by force or the use or attempted use of ships as weapons� States party to the 
convention will have to examine and adjust their national laws to ensure they are 
committed to criminal prosecution of these almost unique offenses�
Fourth, the convention requires states party to designate a “competent author-
ity” to receive and respond to requests for decisions or assistance from other 
states� So far, however, most states party have not done so—leaving a gaping hole 
in implementation� There already exists a similar contact list for senior officials 
who coordinate law-enforcement counterdrug operations� This article concludes 
that states party to the 2005 SUA Convention should develop and publish a simi-
lar list that will facilitate implementation of their treaty obligations�
UNMANNED SYSTEMS—ARTICLE 1(1)
It has become commonplace for civil aircraft to encounter unmanned drones, es-
pecially near airports� We may expect that the regularity of drone flights and the 
controversy over issues of safety, privacy, and security will expand from airspace 
to the water� The barrier to entry for making unmanned systems has fallen, and 
terrorist groups and criminal organizations can develop and employ unmanned 
systems using commercial, off-the-shelf components�8 Underwater and surface 
vehicles provide ample standoff distance from the target, may be used to sequence 
attacks over time, and can be operated in swarms to overwhelm ship defenses�9
One of the most interesting features of the 2005 Protocol is that article 1(1) of 
the SUA, as revised, defines a ship as “a vessel of any type whatsoever not perma-
nently attached to the sea-bed�” The definition includes “dynamically supported 
craft, submersibles, or any other floating craft�” This definition appears to include 
an unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) or unmanned surface vehicle (USV) 
under “a vessel of any type whatsoever�” Similarly, the U�S� Rules of Construction 
Act, which dates to 1873, defines a “vessel” as any “description of water-craft or 
other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of trans-
portation on the water�”10 In the case of Charles Barnes Co. v. One Dredge Boat, the 
U�S� federal court for the Eastern District of Kentucky held that a vessel is defined 
as a “navigable structure, capable of being used for transportation, regardless of 
intent or actual use�”11 Thus, the use of either a UUV or a USV in the commission 
of an offense, as well as acts committed against them, would be covered under 
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the 2005 SUA Convention� In this respect, the 2005 SUA Convention is well po-
sitioned to address threats to or posed by unmanned vessels�
DUAL-USE ITEMS AND MATERIALS—ARTICLE 3BIS
The structure of the 2005 SUA Convention criminalizes acts that by their nature 
or purpose are conducted to intimidate a population or to compel a government 
or an international organization with high explosives or biological, chemical, or 
nuclear devices; the discharge of natural gas or other hazardous substances; or the 
use of a ship in a manner that causes death or serious injury or damage� The legal 
standard for “serious injury or damage” includes not only serious bodily injury or 
death but “extensive destruc-
tion” of a public place that 
results in “major economic 
loss,” and “substantial damage 
to the environment�”12
The 2005 SUA Protocol is 
unique among counterterror-
ism conventions in that it covers the misuse of dual-use materials—the transport 
on board a ship of legitimate items, products, and materials intended to cause or 
in a threat to cause death, serious injury, or damage�13 The proscription includes 
explosive and radioactive materials and equipment designed to process special 
fissionable material, when intended for use in a nuclear explosive activity that is 
not part of an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) comprehensive safe-
guards agreement� Finally, the 2005 Protocol covers “any equipment, materials or 
software or related technology that significantly contributes to the design, manu-
facture or delivery of a BCN [biological, chemical, and nuclear] weapon, with the 
intention that it will be used for such purpose�”14 This provision is exceptional 
because it provides a means to criminalize civilian, commercial, off-the-shelf and 
dual-use items on the basis of their intended use and purpose�
As noted, BCN weapons are those that include biological, chemical, or nuclear 
devices� Biological weapons are “microbial or other biological agents, or toxins�” 
Chemical weapons are “toxic chemicals and their precursors,” excluding those 
intended for “(A) industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical 
or other peaceful purposes; (B) or protective purposes, namely those purposes 
directly related to protection against toxic chemicals and to protection against 
chemical weapons�” Law-enforcement chemicals, such as riot-control agents, 
and those used for military purposes are not included within the definition of 
chemical weapons�15
The treaty is integrated with other international security regimes in several 
ways� First, the list of proscribed items includes toxic chemicals and precursor 
[I]mplementation of the 2005 SUA Conven-
tion has been lackadaisical, and it is unclear 
how well the treaty will contend with . . .  
unmanned systems, lasers, and maritime cy-
ber attacks.
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chemicals, as those terms are defined in the Biological Weapons Convention 
and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)� The SUA also covers nuclear 
weapons and nuclear explosive devices, although radiological weapons are not 
mentioned specifically� Radiological “dirty bombs” are a more likely threat than 
nuclear bombs� Furthermore, amended article 1 also covers toxic chemical and 
precursor by adopting the definitions contained in the CWC� Toxic chemical 
means a substance that through “chemical action on life processes can cause 
death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals�” A 
precursor chemical reacts at any stage in the production of a toxic chemical�16
The terms place of public use, state or government facility, infrastructure facility, 
and public transportation system are drawn from the Terrorist Bombing Conven-
tion�17 Similarly, the terms source material and special fissionable material have 
the same meanings in article 1(2)(b) of the SUA as they have in the statute of the 
IAEA (1956)�18
In its construction of criminal offenses, the 2005 Protocol also leverages the 
offenses in the major multilateral terrorism conventions�19 This approach at-
tempts to weave a tighter, more-integrated legal structure to counter terrorism 
vertically throughout the spectrum of land, sea, and air, as well as horizontally 
along the continuum of crime and violence from planning and conspiracy to car-
rying out a violent attack�
ASYMMETRIC MARITIME CRIME—ARTICLE 3BIS
The 2005 SUA Convention avoids the thorny issue of defining “terrorism,” in-
stead simply creating three separate groups of offenses� The first category com-
prises unlawful and intentional acts of violence against ships or persons on board 
ships� This category includes seizure of a ship or exercise of control over a ship 
by force or threat of force, acts of violence that endanger the safe navigation of a 
ship, destruction of a ship or its cargo, emplacement of a weapon on board a ship, 
destruction of navigational facilities, or communication of false information that 
endangers a ship�20
The second category encompasses acts of transport of certain dangerous ma-
terials or weapons on board a ship for the purpose of intimidating a population, 
government, or international organization�21 This category includes transporting 
aboard a ship explosive devices or radioactive material, with the intent to cause 
death or serious injury or damage; a BCN weapon; fissionable material; or dual-
use material�22
The third category includes acts of commission through a conspiracy, acts as an 
accomplice, or attempts to commit crimes included in the prior two categories�23
The stable of new offenses offers a flexible definition focused on the intention 
of the act or the conduct of violence, rather than murky political motivations� The 
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offenses were designed broadly to cover emerging and new threats, and it bears 
consideration whether the use of a laser against a ship imperils the vessel or its 
crew to the extent that it falls under articles 3, 3bis, and 3quater� However, it is 
unclear where the line is drawn for certain new or emerging acts of intimidation 
such as a cyber attack against a ship’s navigation or communications systems or 
the aforementioned direct action against a vessel using a laser�
In the case of a cyber attack, article 3(1)(e) proscribes any unlawful and in-
tentional act that “seriously interferes with” maritime “navigational facilities” 
and that is “likely to endanger the safe navigation” of a ship� Consequently, cyber 
crimes that endanger a ship are included within the scope of criminal conduct in 
the 2005 SUA Convention�
It is less certain, however, whether other asymmetric attacks are included in 
the definition� In particular, does the use of a laser against the pilothouse of a ves-
sel constitute an “act of violence” against a person on board a ship that is “likely 
to endanger the safe navigation” of the ship?24 This issue turns on the definition 
of what constitutes an “act of violence�” Violence in the law generally is consid-
ered to be “moving, acting, or [conduct] characterized by physical force, espe-
cially by extreme and sudden or by unjust and improper force�”25 This focus on 
“reproaches produced or effected by physical force” raises the question whether 
use of a laser against a ship constitutes an “act of violence�” The Israeli Penal Act 
of 1977 is more circumspect; it defines an “act of violence or terror” as “a crime 
that causes harm to a person’s body or that endangers him for death or for severe 
injury�”26 The use of lasers opens a lacuna in the definition of what constitutes 
an “act of violence” that states should address in implementing legislation� The 
IMO may serve as a fusion point for governments’ views on this issue to facilitate 
uniformity�
COMPETENT AUTHORITY—ARTICLE 8BIS
Article 8bis of the 2005 SUA includes a comprehensive framework to facilitate 
boarding of suspect vessels at sea� In particular, the new provision seeks to en-
sure better coordination during incidents at sea between a warship attempting to 
board a suspicious vessel and the flag state that exercises jurisdiction over that 
vessel� Generally, the flag state has exclusive authority to authorize boarding of 
one of its ships, but in the past states have not always responded to such requests 
in a timely fashion� Article 8bis requires states party to “co-operate to the fullest 
extent possible to prevent and suppress unlawful acts covered by this Conven-
tion � � � and � � � respond to [boarding] requests � � � as expeditiously as possible�”27
The boarding regime does not change the existing international law of the sea 
or infringe on exclusive flag-state control or traditional rights and freedoms of 
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navigation. The boarding regime provides a framework for expedited decision 
making that states party may adopt to facilitate coordination.
The 2005 SUA Convention sets forth a process for cooperation and procedures 
for boarding a ship flying the flag of another state party when the requesting 
party has “reasonable grounds” to suspect that the ship or a person on board the 
ship is, has been, or is about to be involved in the commission of an offense under 
the convention.
States have a general obligation to cooperate “to the fullest extent possible” 
among the states party and to respond to requests from other states party “as 
expeditiously as possible.”28 
Requests for boarding should 
be accompanied by, inter alia, 
the name of the vessel, its 
IMO ship identification num-
ber, and its port of registry.29 
Article 8bis(3) is a reminder that it is often impossible to conduct a thorough 
inspection of either a small craft or a large commercial vessel at sea, and often 
the best course of action is to bring the ship into port to facilitate the inspection. 
This provision requires the boarding state to consider the particular “dangers and 
difficulties” involved in boarding a ship under way.
Article 8bis(4) provides a mechanism whereby a state party with reasonable 
grounds to suspect that an offense delineated in article 3, 3bis, 3ter, or 3quater has 
been, is being, or is about to be committed “involving a ship flying its flag” may 
request the assistance of other states party.30 The requesting party that encounters 
beyond the territorial sea a ship of another country that is suspected of an offense 
under article 3, 3bis, 3ter, or 3quater must follow the steps set forth in the new 
article. The flag state should confirm the nationality of the vessel, and if national-
ity is confirmed the flag state has four options: (1) it may authorize the requesting 
state authority to board; (2) it may conduct a boarding and search with its own 
forces; (3) it may conduct a boarding with its forces working in tandem with the 
boarding forces of the requesting state; or (4) it may decline the requesting state 
permission to board.31
When the requesting party boards a foreign-flagged ship and finds evidence 
of offenses under article 3, 3bis, 3ter, or 3quater, the flag state may authorize the 
requesting party temporarily to detain the ship, cargo, and persons on board, 
pending receipt of further instructions from the flag state. In any case, the re-
questing party must inform the flag state of the results of the boarding, search, 
and detention, including discovery of evidence of a violation of article 3, 3bis, 
3ter, or 3quater or illegal conduct that is not a subject of the convention.32
The provision is exceptional because it pro-
vides a means to criminalize civilian, com-
mercial, off-the-shelf and dual-use items on 
the basis of their intended use and purpose.
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These interactions between the flag state and the requesting state are facili-
tated through the designated “competent authority” of the flag state, and the suc-
cess of cooperation hinges on responsive and iterative engagement� States party 
agree to designate within one month of becoming a party an official authority (or 
authorities) to serve as a liaison with other nations on time-sensitive issues aris-
ing under the treaty, such as receiving and responding to requests for assistance, 
confirmation of vessel nationality, and seeking authorization to take appropriate 
law-enforcement measures�33
Each state is to make the designation to the IMO secretary-general, who pro-
mulgates it among member states�34 However, out of forty states, such notification 
has been made by only four: Latvia, San Marino, Sweden, and the United States� 
Latvia has designated the Naval Forces Coast Guard Service as the appropriate 
authority to receive requests for assistance, and the Security Police and Prosecu-
tor General’s Office as the points of contact for confirmation of nationality and 
authorization to take appropriate measures� Similarly, Sweden has designated the 
Swedish Coastguard Regional Command as the authority to receive and respond 
to requests for confirmation of ship nationality, and the Ministry of Justice as au-
thority for requests to take measures against Swedish vessels� San Marino and the 
United States have a single point of contact each, the Civil Aviation and Maritime 
Navigation Authority and the U�S� Coast Guard Liaison Office to the U�S� State 
Department, respectively� This low rate of compliance for designation of a com-
petent authority risks atrophy of the 2005 SUA Convention, and remedial action 
by states party is required�35
The Vienna Drug Convention offers a clear model for effective coordination 
of maritime interdiction and boarding at sea or in port� Under article 17 of the 
convention, states party are obligated to cooperate to suppress illicit drug traf-
ficking by sea� States party that have reasonable grounds to suspect a vessel fly-
ing a foreign flag is engaged in illicit traffic may notify the flag state and request 
confirmation of registry and authorization to take appropriate measures against 
the suspect ship� In such a case, the flag state may authorize boarding, search, and 
seizure of evidence in accordance with agreements or arrangements between the 
two states� States party “shall respond expeditiously” to inquiries, and states that 
take action against a foreign-flag ship shall “promptly inform the flag State�”36
To facilitate these interactions and ensure efficient and effective communi-
cations and decision making, the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) has produced a Directory of Competent National Authorities�37 The 
directory provides points of contact and decision-making authorities for requests 
for extradition, mutual legal assistance, and cooperation against illicit traffic by 
sea, including the smuggling of migrants and firearms�38 The IMO and member 
states should develop a similar directory of competent authorities to facilitate 
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requests made pursuant to the 2005 SUA Convention, with the goal of perhaps 
combining the points of contact for maritime interdiction under article 17 of the 
UNODC directory with the IMO directory to render a comprehensive volume on 
government points of contact and decision making for maritime matters�
After the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the 2005 
SUA Convention has the potential to become one of the most important instru-
ments for maritime security, 
on the order of SOLAS� How-
ever, there is no question that, 
for now, it is woefully under-
subscribed and underutilized� 
The slow implementation of 
the 2005 SUA Convention is 
reminiscent of that for the 
1988 Convention, which, 
while widely accepted (with some 150 states party), has been used only once (as 
far as I know) to assert jurisdiction over a suspected criminal�
In that case, United States v. Shi, the U�S� government asserted jurisdiction over 
the defendant, whom U�S� Coast Guard officers picked up sixty nautical miles off 
the coast of Hilo, Hawaii, from the F/V Full Means No. 2, a Taiwan ship registered 
in the Seychelles�39 Shi was a Chinese crew member who killed the captain and 
first mate of the ship after they beat him severely and demoted him from cook 
to deckhand� Subsequently, Shi was overpowered by the crew and held captive 
until turned over to the Coast Guard and the Federal Bureau of Investigation� 
Shi’s conviction by the federal district court in Hawaii was upheld by the U�S� 
Ninth Circuit�40
The United States asserted jurisdiction over Shi under 18 U�S�C� § 2280(b)(1)
(C), the U�S� implementing legislation for the 1988 SUA Convention�41 That legis-
lation was adopted to assert U�S� jurisdiction in accordance with the convention, 
which requires states party to extradite or prosecute offenders regardless of where 
the offenders’ acts occurred� Title 18 U�S�C� § 2280 authorizes federal jurisdiction 
over any offender “later found” in the United States, and the district court found 
that it had jurisdiction over Shi�42 Congress’s authority to establish jurisdiction 
by statute is granted in the “offense clause” of the Constitution, which empow-
ers Congress to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high 
Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations�”43
The Shi case is remarkable and important today for two reasons� First, the 
United States used its implementing legislation for the 1988 SUA Convention 
to establish jurisdiction over Shi, and this action did not require any liaison or 
The 2005 Protocol attempts to weave a tighter, 
more-integrated legal structure to counter 
terrorism vertically throughout the spectrum 
of land, sea, and air, as well as horizontally 
along the continuum of crime and violence 
from planning and conspiracy to carrying out 
a violent attack.
Printer_Winter2017Review.indb   19 12/15/16   1:53 PM
9
Kraska: Effective Implementation of the 2005 Convention for the Suppressi
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
 2 0  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
correspondence with other nations involved: neither the flag state of the ship nor 
the authorities of Shi’s nationality (China) nor those of the nationalities of his 
two victims (Taiwan and Chinese)� The successful prosecution underscores the 
successful operation of implementing legislation to prosecute crimes committed 
under the 1988 Convention� Second, the Shi case is the only known example of a 
criminal prosecution under the 1988 Convention, underscoring the gulf that lies 
between what legal realists might say is “law on the books” and “law in action�”44
In crafting and adopting the 2005 SUA Convention, the member states of the 
IMO and the IMO secretariat have advanced the program of the rule of law in 
the oceans and furthered the goal of greater maritime security� The convention is 
a cornerstone instrument for bringing the rule of law to the oceans, but it is only 
a first step� As with much of international law, the success of the 2005 conven-
tion lies in its implementation, not merely its adoption at the international level� 
States must integrate their IMO commitments into effective national action that 
includes domestic rules, interagency resources and authorities, and mechanisms 
for real-time collaboration� Toward this end, states might explore how to ap-
proach new threats and define new crimes based on unmanned systems, dual-use 
materials, and asymmetric attacks on ships, as well as ensure they have built out 
“backroom” procedural and logistical mechanisms, such as designation of com-
petent authorities to facilitate international collaboration to enforce maritime 
security measures�
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